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THE LIMITED RELEVANCE OF PLAIN
MEANING
STEPHEN F. ROSS*
In this essay, I want to take the heretical position that linguists' principal
expertise-ascertaining how language is used by ordinary speakers of
English-is often of little value in interpreting controversial non-criminal
federal statutes.' These statutes, to use Ed Rubin's phrase, are usually not
"transitive": they are not directed at ordinary citizen speakers of English,
but at a small community of lawyers, regulators, and people subject to their
specific regulations.2 Although linguistic techniques might still aid in
understanding their meaning, my thesis is that extrinsic evidence that is
known and accessible to this small sub-community-such as legislative
history, established norms of construction, and other evidence about the
context in which the legislation arose-is more likely than linguistic
analysis to help an outside judge shed light on what Congress meant and
how the statute is to be understood.3 Rather than serving as the principal
means of interpretation, a statute's ordinary meaning should be a weak, tie-
breaking default factor in most cases, to be used only when the judge
* Professor of Law, University of Illinois. A.B., J.D. (1976), University of California (Berkeley)
(1979). Special thanks to Jim Brudney, John Cribbet, Kit Kinports, Bob Lawless, Peter Maggs, Peter
Strauss, and Charles Tabb for the extraordinary speed and quality of their insightful comments on an
earlier draft of this essay.
1. I discuss federal criminal statutes below. Because my thesis is that ordinary meaning is
significantly less relevant than legislative history, my argument has considerably less force when there
is no legislative history and thus ordinary meaning is the only way to interpret statutory language-as
may often be the case when interpreting state and local legislation.
Of course, most statutory interpretation is based on ordinary meaning-it is done by lawyers and
people subject to specific legal regulations every day, and there are no interpretive disputes that arise.
In these contexts, of course, the use of expert linguists to tell people what they already know is
superfluous.
2. Edward L. Rubin, Law and Legislation in the Administraive State, 89 COLUM. L. REv. 369,
381, 383 (1989).
3. The Conference Proceedings show some support for this view among the linguists. See, e.g.,
Law and Linguistics Conference, 73 WASH. U. L.Q. 800, 854 (1995) (Prof. Sadock) (most "artifact
words" have "built into them some kind of purpose," which is must be determined using extra-textual,
pragmatic mechanisms); id. at 931 (Prof. Geis) (arguing that contract language should be understandable
by ordinary people because woman signing pre-nuptial agreement was not a member of the "communi-
ty" of lawyers who understood meaning of linguistically "incompetent" text); id. at 951-52 (Prof.
Sadock) (discussing ability of all people "in all uses of language" to impute significance to an utterance
that is different from that which is carried solely by the conventional meanings of the language used).
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cannot confidently interpret the statute based on extrinsic indicia of the
legislation's meaning as understood by legislators and those actually subject
to the legislation.
I confess to heresy because ordinary meaning is so heavily emphasized
by interpreters of all the leading schools of statutory interpreta-
tion-whether they are textualists like Holmes, who purported to be
concerned only about what Congress said, and not what it meant;4 or
intentionalists like Hart and Sacks, who attempt to effectuate the
legislature's purpose for acting pro bono publico unless doing so would
result in an interpretation that the text "cannot bear;"5 or dynamic
interpreters like Eskridge, who believes that interpretation requires a
"fusion" of the perspectives of the original drafters and the current-day
interpreters, but that "rule of law values" preclude interpretations complete-
ly contrary to ordinary meaning.6
These so-called "rule of law values" seem to underlie the emphasis
placed on ordinary meaning by all three dominant modes of statutory
interpretation prevalent today. Finding a precise definition of this oft-cited
phrase in judicial opinions or the legal literature is quite difficult. Most
often, the phrase seems to be used in two related but discrete contexts. The
first one is a call for judicial objectivity. Justice Scalia distinguishes the
"general rule of law" from a judge's "personal discretion to do justice."7
Justice Holmes, in the same vein, opined that a government of law requires
legal standards external to the decisionmaker' This goal is accomplished
by a jurisprudence of rules that provides "legal certainty, predictability, and
4. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Theory of Legal Interpretation, 12 HARV. L. REV. 417, 419
(1899).
5. HENRY M. HART, JR. & ALBERT M. SACKS, THE LEGAL PROCESS 1374 (William N. Eskridge,
Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, eds., 1994).
6. William N. Eskridge, Jr., Gadamer/Statutory Interpretation, 90 COLUM. L. REV. 609, 650
(1990); William N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REv. 1479, 1483,
1543 (1987).
7. Antonin Scalia, The Rule of Law as a Law of Rules, 56 U. CaL. L. REv. 1175, 1176 (1989).
Cf. Mark Tushnet, Book Review: Metaprocedure?, 63 S. CAL. L. REV. 161, 172-73 (1989) (Reviewing
Procedure by Robert M. Cover, Owen M. Fiss & Judith Resnick) ("[Tlhe standard version of the rule
of law is that it is designed to create a 'government of laws, not of men, which is to say that lawmakers
should subordinate their personal and (therefore, at least implicitly) emotional reactions to the case at
hand to the more general requirements of constructing a viable social order.").
8. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 41, 44 (1963). See also Heckler v.
Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 849 (1985) (Marshall, 3., dissenting) (unreviewability of certain HHS decisions
is "fundamentally at odds with rule-of-law principles firmly embedded in our jurisprudence because it
seeks to truncate an emerging line ofjudicial authority subjecting enforcement discretion to rational and
principled constraint').
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objectivity."9 To the extent that courts consistently use extrinsic aids in a
predictable and objective fashion, there is nothing about this version of
"rule-of-law values" that suggestions the primacy of ordinary meaning.
Indeed, while others have developed sophisticated analyses designed to
promote the use of legislative history in an objective fashion,' ° the
supposed objectivity of ordinary meaning as an interpretive technique is
generally asserted rather than demonstrated. Actually, as Peter Strauss has
observed, history teaches "that judicial refusals to consider the political
history of legislation easily turns into the substitution of judicial pleasure
to that of the legislative body.""
Second, the concept of the "rule-of-law" is also frequently employed to
describe the proposition that "citizens ought to be able to read the statute
books and know their rights and duties."' 2 Today, of course, as Ed Rubin
notes, legal rules are not communicated to the ordinary citizen "by their
verbal formulation in the statute books."' 3 Indeed, most statutes are, in
Rubin's lexicon, intransitive: they do not apply to ordinary citizens. Where
non-criminal statutes do apply to the citizenry, they usually do so via
administrative regulations (which probably should be written in understand-
able English) 4 or concern special areas of law that no ordinary citizen
would attempt to comply with without legal advice. Lawyers, unlike
ordinary speakers of English, are likely to be familiar with the usual means
of communication in the sub-community-the statute's background and
legislative history.
For these reasons, on both normative and descriptive grounds I must
9. Daniel A. Farber, The Inevitability of Practical Reason: Statutes, Formalism, and the Rule of
Law, 45 VAND. L. REV. 533, 534 (1992).
10. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, On the Uses of Legislative History in Interpreting Statutes, 65 S.
CAL. L. REv. 845 (1992); James J. Brudney, Congressional Commentary on Judicial Interpretations
of Statutes: Idle Chatter or Telling Response?, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1, 42-47 (1994); Orrin Hatch,
Legislative History: Tool of Construction or Destruction, 11 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 43 (1988).
11. Peter L. Strauss, When the Judge Is Not the Primary Official with Responsibility to Read:
Agency Interpretation and the Problem of Legislative History, 66 CHI. KENT L. REv. 321, 322 n.3
(1990). See also Hatch, supra note 10, at 43 ("Text without context often invites confusion and judicial
adventurism ... In today's era of renewed substantive due process and free-wheeling statutory
interpretation, reliable forms of legislative history can once again serve as additional strands to tie
judges to the law itself").
12. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical Reasoning,
42 STAN. L. REv. 321, 340 (1990). See also Rubin, supra note 2, at 404 (discussing Professor Lon
Fuller's exposition of rule-of-law values as all "derive[d] from the single, underlying norm that people
should understand the legal rules they are expected to obey").
13. Rubin, supra note 2, at 404.
14. Id. at 405-06.
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respectfully disagree with Bill Eskridge and Phil Frickey's view that
"statutory text should be the key source of statutory meaning" because it
"is the primary means by which citizens, agencies, and courts coordinate
their understandings."' 5
One illustration of this point is Train v. Colorado Public Interest
Research Group.6 The case involved an interpretation of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act (the "Act"), which required water polluters to
use the "best practicable" equipment to clean up water. The issue was
whether the Act applied to the discharge of radioactive effluents from two
nuclear power plants subject to pre-existing regulation by the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission, which required polluters to try to keep releases "as
low as is reasonably achievable." A unanimous Supreme Court held that the
Act did not apply to radioactive discharges from NRC-regulated nuclear
plants, even though the statute required that anyone discharging a pollutant
obtain a permit from the Environmental Protection Agency using the higher
standard, and defined pollutant to include "radioactive materials." Reversing
the court of appeals' judgment that the plain meaning of the statute
compelled the conclusion that radioactive discharges were "pollutants" and
thus subject to the Act, the Supreme Court held that, "however clear the
words may appear on 'superficial examination," the legislative history
demonstrated that Congress did not intend to subject nuclear power plants
to overlapping scrutiny by both the EPA and the NRC. 7 This history
included unequivocal language in the House Committee Report excluding
these plants from EPA jurisdiction, a Senate floor colloquy which is best
read to suggest that the NRC's traditionally exclusive jurisdiction over
nuclear power plants would not be affected by the Act, defeat on the House
floor of an amendment that would have undercut exclusive NRC jurisdic-
tion, an unequivocal statement from the ranking minority member among
the House conferees that the bill did not affect NRC-regulated polluters,
and the subsequent House defeat of a proposal to shift regulatory authority
for nuclear pollution to the EPA. The Court concluded that it was
"abundantly clear after a review of the legislative materials that reliance on
the 'plain meaning' of the words 'radioactive materials' contained in the
definition of 'pollutant' in the [Act] contributes little to our understanding
of whether Congress intended the Act to encompass the regulation of...
15. William N. Eskridge, Jr. & Philip P. Frickey, Foreword: Law as Equilibrium, 108 HARV. L.
REV. 27, 57 (1994).
16. 426 U.S. 1 (1976).
17. Id. at 10 (quoting United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534, 543-44 (1940)).
[VOL. 73:1057
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nuclear materials."' 8
I would add to the Court's conclusion that it is also abundantly clear to
anyone who understands how regulated industries work that Congress'
intent was most certainly obvious to lawyers and regulators from the EPA,
the NRC, the nuclear power industry, and environmental organizations, all
of whom were familiar with the historical context of a strong, if controver-
sial, policy of exclusive NRC jurisdiction over the nuclear power industry
and the easily accessible legislative history. The Court's ruling was
predictable, and congressional intent was clear. Because the legislation was
completely intransitive, no citizen was ever in doubt as to how to conduct
her affairs. (The EPA disclaimed jurisdiction by rulemaking, so operators
of nuclear power plants knew they need not obtain a permit from that
agency.) Thus, the decision fully comports with "rule-of-law" values. 9
The Court's approach in Train is superior to one based on the way the
text alone would be understood by ordinary speakers of English. Because
the drafters intended, and the readers affected by the statute understood,
that when Congress passed a bill that told the EPA to regulate "all
pollutants," but in clear legislative history excepted pollutants regulated by
the NRC, "all pollutants" actually meant "all pollutants other than those
regulated by the NRC." My point is not quite the same as the one
frequently made by Conference participants, who suggested that lawyers,
judges, and other public officials often disregard the ordinary meaning of
words not because of dispute about meaning but rather because laws are
sometimes intended to be "regulatory variables" to be ignored in appropri-
ate situations, rather than literal commands (the surgeon should proceed
with a lifesaving tracheotomy rather than obey the ordinance barring any
"bloodletting in the street"). 0 Rather, my claim is that ordinary speakers
of English understand a text that says "all pollutants" differently from those
intimately involved with creating and implementing policy in Con-
gress-lawyers, at the EPA, the NRC, the regulated firms, and environmen-
tal groups-all of whom are familiar with the legislative history that creates
an exception for pollutants regulated by the NRC, in the same way that a
18. Id. at 23-24.
19. Indeed, the Supreme Court's recent insistence on imposing its view of ordinary meaning, at
the expense of the probably shared meaning of the linguistic sub-community, has resulted in many cases
where the law is unclear and unstable. See Peter L. Strauss, On Resegregating the Worlds of Statute and
Common Law, 1995 SUP. CT. REV. (forthcoming).
20. See, eg., Law and Linguistics Conference, supra note 3, at 842-43 (Prof. Levi); id. at 847, 944
(Prof. Schauer).
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sign that says "no ads on the subway" is understood differently by the
ordinary American (who thinks of a subway as a subterranean rapid transit
system) and the ordinary Briton (to whom a subway is a subterranean
pedestrian walkway).
Bankruptcy law is "transitive" under Rubin's methodology, but rule of
law values do. not suggest that plain meaning ought to prevail in that area
either. Consider Shine v. Shine.21 In that case, the plaintiff had been
awarded monthly alimony payments in an "action for separate mainte-
nance" commenced when she and the defendant separated. The parties were
subsequently divorced; the divorce decree made no provision for alimony
or support. When the plaintiff finally brought suit to enforce the judgment
for past-due alimony, the defendant declared bankruptcy. The issue before
the court was whether the debt was non-dischargeable under Section
523(a)(5) of the Bankruptcy Code, a provision amended in 1978 which
excepted from discharge debts "to a ... former spouse.., in connection
with a separation agreement, divorce decree, or property settlement agree-
ment."
22
A distinguished panel of the First Circuit refused to follow the plain
meaning of the statute, reasoning that doing so would be contrary to the
long-standing congressional policy excepting spousal and child support
from discharge in bankruptcy. Consulting the legislative history, the court
concluded that the drafters' intent was to expand the area of non-
dischargeability beyond the support and alimony obligations that had
traditionally been included and to encompass lump-sum property settle-
ments agreed to in connection with a divorce settlement as well. The court
took note of the "harried and hurried atmosphere" in which the bill was
finally enacted, observing that the committee reports made no mention of
any intended change in policy, and that, subsequent to the filing of the
complaint in Shine, Congress corrected the statute to make clear that
alimony awarded was a non-dischargeable debt regardless of the precise
form of the judicial order.24
If we were to assume that Mr. Shine made plans to avoid paying
alimony, considered filing for bankruptcy, made a trip to the public library,
read Section 523(a)(5), and was an ordinary speaker of English, we might
well conclude that "rule-of-law values" required the court to find the debt
21. 802 F.2d 583 (Ist Cir. 1986).
22. 11 U.S.C. § 523(a)(5) (Supp. 11 1978).
23. The panel consisted of Judges Coffin, Bownes and Breyer.
24. 802 F.2d at 587.
[VOL. 73:1057
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dischargeable because it was not made in connection with either a
separation agreement, a divorce decree, or a property settlement agreement.
But, in fact, it is extremely improbable that Mr. Shine did any such thing.
To the extent that Mr. Shine thought about the statute at all, he no doubt
consulted a bankruptcy attorney. The attorney would have been familiar
with the historical background of the provision (these types of debts were
clearly non-dischargeable, prior to the 1978 Bankruptcy Act amend-
ments)25 and the purpose of section 523(a)(5) (as spelled out in the
committee reports and the report of the Commission on the Bankruptcy
Laws). And if the interpretive regime were, as I propose, to strongly favor
reliance on extrinsic aids, the result would be predictable and clear.
The one area where the foregoing analysis suggests that plain meaning
does matter involves penal and criminal statutes. Here, the "rule of lenity"
requires that statutory ambiguities be resolved in favor of the defendant.26
But the policies underlying the rule of lenity suggest that, here too, plain
meaning may be less important than might initially appear. The rule of
lenity is based on two important principles: providing clear notice to the
defendant, and protecting against the government's arbitrary prosecution of
vague crimes.27 Where neither concern is present, the rule of lenity ought
not apply, and a defendant may properly be convicted of violating a statute
containing a lexical ambiguity.
Consider People v. Soto,2" an appeal of a conviction for grand larceny,
which the state's criminal code defined to include larceny when "the
property taken is a bicycle, horse, mare, gelding, cow, steer, bull, calf,
mule, jack, jenny, goat, sheep, or hog."2 9 The court rejected the
defendant's contention that, because the animal stolen was in fact a heifer,
the evidence was at variance with the indictment and the defendant had not
violated the statute. Had Soto's attorney secured the services of professional
linguists to engage in the type of empirical study of "cow" and "heifer"
that was undertaken for "enterprise" in the Yale Law Journal, I suppose
that the study would have demonstrated that many did not think the word
cow included the younger heifer, especially in the context of a list of
25. Id. Even a relatively unsophisticated practitioner not personally familiar with the legislative
history would surely be familiar with leading specialty treatises, whose authors certainly would have
read and included the background and history into their own analysis.
26. McNally v. United States, 483 U.S. 350, 359-60 (1987).
27. See, e.g., 3 J.G. SUTHERLAND, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 59.03 (Norman
Singer, ed. 1992); Rubin, supra note 2, at 397.
28. 49 Cal. 67 (1874).
29. CAL. PENAL CODE § 487 (1872).
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bovine animals that included cows, steers, and bulls. The court thought it
significant that the legislature intended to make it a felony to steal a cow,
and concluded that the enumeration of other bovines was not intended to
exclude heifers. Although the decision relied on a specific provision of
California law overturning the common law mandate that criminal statutes
be strictly construed, there is no reason to suspect that federal courts would
reach a different result today under current interpretations of the rule of
lenity.3 °
Committed textualists may continue to insist that the meaning which
ordinary speakers of English attach to statutory text is important, either
because of their controversial and formalistic view that the Constitution
proscribes authoritative reference to legislative history,3' because of the
arguable but unprovable empirical claim that extrinsic aids like legislative
history are so unreliable that ordinary meaning will lead interpreters to the
accurate result over a greater range of cases32 (although linguists have cast
considerable doubt on textualists' favorite extrinsic aid-dictionaries),33
or because, acting like national nannies, judges believe that an insistence
on plain meaning will improve the clarity of legislative drafting and thereby
make their own jobs easier.34 Others may argue that ordinary meaning is
30. Consider Nat'l Org. for Women, Inc. v. Scheidler, 114 S. Ct. 798 (1994). There, the Court
unanimously reversed a court of appeals holding that anti-abortion activists could not be found liable
under RICO because the absence of a profit motive precluded a finding that the defendants' alleged
conspiracy was an "enterprise." While the case was on appeal, several of the linguists participating in
the Conference presented empirical research concluding that "English speakers divide into two groups
as to how they understand the word enterprise--one group looking at whether the activity in question
is organized for the achievement of a common goal, and another group focusing on whether the entity
is like a business. Clark D. Cunningham et al., Plain Meaning and Hard Cases, 103 YALE L.J. 1561,
1595 (1994). Still, the Court had no problem finding the statute clear. Conceding that Congress had not
anticipated RICO's coverage of non-profit enterprises, the Court concluded that this demonstrated
breadth rather than ambiguity. 114 S. Ct. at 806. Heifer thieves are unlikely to fare better than anti-
abortion protesters under this type of analysis.
31. See, e.g., Thompson v. Thompson, 484 U.S. 174, 192 (Scalia, J., concurring in the judgment).
For criticisms of this view, see WILLAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMAIc STATUTORY INTERPRETATION,
230-34 (1994); Brudney, supra note 10, at 42-47.
32. See, e.g., Blanchard v. Bergeron, 489 U.S. 87, 98-99 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring). For
contrary views, see note 10 supra.
33. See Cunningham et al., supra note 30, at 1614-16.
34. In Chisom v. Roemer, 111 S. Ct. 2354, 2376 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting), for example, non-
textual interpretations are decried because they "depriv[e] legislators of the assurance that ordinary
terms, used in an ordinary context, will be given a predictable meaning." There is no evidence,
however, that legislators have ever sought or prefer this assurance. See, e.g., Hatch, supra note 10.
Moreover, as Dan Farber asks, where does Justice Scalia derive his authority to tell Congress how to
write laws? Farber, supra note 9, at 550 n.89. This approach seems inappropriate in a government of
supposedly co-equal branches. Strauss, supra note 19, at (manuscript at 89).
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a useful interpretive tool for judges who lack the expertise and/or interest
in delving into a statute's background and legislative history to determine
how the words are understood by the particular linguistic sub-community
affected by the legislation." Recent scholarship by three colleagues
suggests, however, that as a normative matter this justification for ignoring
background and legislative history results in incoherent law and bad
doctrine.36 None of these claims strike me as particularly persuasive,
although an in-depth analysis is beyond the scope of this short essay.
My analysis also suggests that "rule-of-law values" do not require judges
using purposive or dynamic modes of interpretation to give great weight to
the meaning that statutes have for ordinary speakers of English either.
Where statutes are intransitive or addressed to a narrow subject unlikely to
be acted on by ordinary citizens absent legal counsel, an interpreter faithful
to Hart, Sacks, or Eskridge need ask only if the interpretation is one that
would be understood by others in the linguistic sub-community.
Although, in my ideal world of statutory interpretation, the contributions
of linguistics would be relatively modest, linguists can serve an extremely
positive role in the real world, where courts still maintain that plain
meaning is very important. In my view, the most important role is to
demonstrate that many statutes actually do not have a single meaning to
ordinary speakers of English. This is the conclusion arrived at in most of
the cases discussed in Solan's book3 7 and the Yale article.38 There will
be another large sample of cases, however, where the legislative history is
silent, opaque, or where an interpreter suspects legislative shenanigans that
deprive the history of its probative value. (Suppose, for example, that the
Senate and House floor debates in Train yielded conflicting answers to the
EPA's jurisdiction, or, alternatively, that the sole piece of legislative history
to contradict the text's ordinary meaning was one floor speech by a leading
advocate of the nuclear industry with no confirmation from the bill's
35. See Frederick Schauer, Statutory Construction and the Coordinating Function of Plain
Meaning, 1990 Sup. CT, REv. 231. Of course, linguistics might not aid judges in these cases;
presumably, a judge who is not inclined to explore the political history of a dry statute will not perk
up at the prospect of undertaking a serious linguistic analysis of the same text.
36. See Charles J. Tabb & Robert M. Lawless, Of Commas, Gerunds, and Conjunctions: The
Bankruptcy Jurisprudence of the Rehnquist Court, 42 SYR. L. REv. 823 (1991); Stephen M. Bainbridge,
Securities Act Section 12(2) After the Gustafson Debacle, 40 Bus. LAW. (forthcoming 1995).
37. LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF JUDGES (1993).
38 Cunningham et al., supra note 30.
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sponsor.)39 In such cases, the use of accepted linguistic techniques to
inform the court about the meaning ascribed to the text by the members of
the linguistic sub-community may be useful.
Linguistics can also make an important contribution in those bizarre
cases where courts closely divide on the interpretation of a statute's
ordinary meaning. Consider Regan v. Wald,4" a challenge to an executive
order issued by President Reagan barring ordinary travel to Cuba. The
President had chosen not to follow the procedures required by then-current
law for issuing such an order, relying instead on a grandparent clause that
authorized the President to continue exercising "the authorities conferred
upon the President by section 5(b) of the Trading With the Enemy Act
which were being exercised with respect to a country on July 1, 1977."41
The controversy arose because, although President Kennedy had initially
ordered the Cuban embargo pursuant to section 5(b) in 1963, President
Carter had issued an order in March and May of 1977, permitting some
economic dealings with Cuba, including ordinary travel.42 Five Supreme
Court Justices held that the plain meaning of the grandparent clause
allowed Reagan to add additional restrictions to the embargo in effect in
July of 1977; four Supreme Court Justices and three First Circuit Judges
(including one future Supreme Court Justice) concluded that the plain
meaning of the clause meant that Reagan could not add additional
restrictions to Carter's pre-existing embargo. Based on the accepted
linguistic methodology employed in the Yale Law Journal article, one
would think that the Justices would agree that the very fact of their own
disagreement concerning the clause's ordinary meaning would itself suggest
that the meaning was not ordinary. Unfortunately, there seem to be few
cases thus far where the Justices have reached this conclusion.43 Hopeful-
ly, a greater understanding of linguistic techniques would facilitate such
reasoning on their part.
In their invitation to participate in this symposium, Professors
39. One of the unfortunate effects of the New Textualism may be to make legislative history
somewhat less reliable, if legislators are less inclined to respond to manufactured and inaccurate
legislative history under the mistaken notion that Justice Scalia's legisprudence is typical.
40. 468 U.S. 222 (1984).
41. Pub. L. No. 95-223, § 101(b).
42. 42 Fed. Reg. 16621, 24599 (1977).
43. The only example with which I am familiar is United States v. Granderson, 114 S. Ct. 1259,
1262 n.2 (1994), where Justice Ginsburg's majority opinion criticizes the reliance on plain meaning in
Justice Kennedy's dissent on the ground that no other judge that had "essayed construction of the
prescription at issue has come upon the answer Justice Kennedy finds clear."
[VOL. 73:1057
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Cunningham and Levi sought to provoke comment by asking what would
happen if laws were applied based on the way the average citizen
understood them. My response is to "fight the hypo" by suggesting that
laws are not written for, nor need they be understood by, the average
citizen speaker of English. Rather, most federal statutes are written for a
narrower linguistic sub-community of specialists and lawyers. Those
outsiders called upon to resolve disputes among members of this sub-
community should, like outside arbitrators resolving disputes under the
Uniform Commercial Code, place much greater significance on the statute's
background and history, as such is understood by those "in the trade,"'
rather than on the "plain meaning" of the black textual letters written on
the pieces of paper bound together as the United States Code.
44. See, e.g., Nanakuli Paving & Rock Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 664 F.2d 772 (9th Cir. 1981) (despite
contract language setting price at "Shell's Posted Price at time of delivery," court applies trade usage
that waived price increases for sales needed to complete projects that Nanakuli had already bid and
won).
1995] 1067
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